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Abstract
In recent years, Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS)
evolved from a futuristic-sounding research project to
an increasingly affordable technology for determining
complete genome sequences of complex organisms, in-
cluding humans. This prompts a wide range of revolu-
tionary applications, as WGS promises to improve mod-
ern healthcare and provide a better understanding of the
human genome – in particular, its relation to diseases
and response to treatments. However, this progress
raises worrisome privacy and ethical issues, since, be-
sides uniquely identifying its owner, the genome con-
tains a treasure trove of highly personal and sensitive in-
formation. In this article, after summarizing recent ad-
vances in genomics, we discuss some important privacy
issues associated with human genomic information and
identify a number of particularly relevant research chal-
lenges.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed impressive advances in
DNA sequencing. Both throughput and affordability of
new-generation sequencing platforms have increased at
a pace faster than Moore’s Law would otherwise pre-
dict. It seems quite reasonable to assume that, in a few
years, most individuals in developed countries will have
the means of having their genomes sequenced, thus en-
abling personalized genomic medicine and facilitating
preventive treatment and diagnosis.
However, for now this remains only a prospect and
much more research is needed to understand the very
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Magazine, Vol. 48, No. 2, February 2015, under the title “Whole
Genome Sequencing: Revolutionary Medicine or Privacy Nightmare.
∗ Work done while author was with PARC (a Xerox company).
complex relationship between genome and health. To
conduct this research, the scientific community needs
large cohorts of patients (or volunteers) willing to
share their genetic material. For instance, the Personal
Genome Project involves participants that agree to have
their genomic data – along with other personal infor-
mation – made publicly available on the Internet, which
raises many potential privacy, ethical, and legal con-
cerns.
The first documented case of privacy issues dates
back to the end of the 19th century, triggered by the
availability of a new and revolutionary observation and
identification tool: the photo camera. Since then, sev-
eral other such tools have become widespread, includ-
ing: video cameras, credit cards, Web browsers, and
mobile phones. These tools reveal our presence and
habits in various spheres of life, as well as our com-
munication and mobility patterns. DNA sequencing
greatly exacerbates this problem, as the genome rep-
resents our ultimate biological identity. By combin-
ing genomic data with information about one’s envi-
ronment or lifestyle (often easily obtainable from social
networks), could make it possible to infer that individ-
ual’s phenotype.
In general, access to genomic data prompts some im-
portant privacy concerns: (i) DNA reflects information
about genetic conditions and predispositions to specific
diseases such as Alzheimer’s, cancer, or schizophrenia,
(ii) DNA contains information about ancestors, siblings,
and progeny, (iii) DNA (almost) does not change over
time, hence revoking or replacing it (as with other forms
of identification) is impossible, and (iv) DNA analysis is
already being used both in law enforcement and health-
care, thus prompting numerous ethical issues. Further-
more, it is hard to assess or estimate the extent of the
personal information that could be extracted or derived
1
ar
X
iv
:1
30
6.
12
64
v5
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
6 F
eb
 20
15
from the genome in the future.
In this article, after briefly over-viewing some basic
genomic concepts, we describe some expected benefits
of personalized medicine and discuss notable privacy
issues, as well as associated research challenges.
2 Background
This section provides a brief genomics primer.
2.1 Processing chain
The human genome is encoded in double stranded
DNA molecules consisting of two complementary poly-
mer chains. Each chain consists of simple units called
nucleotides (A,C,G,T). The DNA of a person can be
retrieved from various sources (e.g., saliva, hair, skin,
blood). Once a sample is collected, the genetic ma-
terial is extracted and then sequenced – using a DNA
sequencing platform – to obtain the so-called raw
DNA sequence. This is usually in the form of short
reads, each including hundreds of nucleotides from ran-
dom parts of the genome. Next, the raw reads are
quality-controlled, analyzed, and aligned to the refer-
ence genome (digital nucleic acid sequence database,
assembled by scientists as a representative example of
our species’ set of genes), allowing the progressive re-
construction of the whole sequenced genome. The col-
lection of all aligned raw reads is usually a SAM (se-
quence alignment/map) file. There are hundreds of mil-
lions of short reads (each including around 100 nu-
cleotides) in the SAM file. Each nucleotide is included
in several short reads to have high coverage of each
subject’s DNA. After further analysis of the SAM file,
eventually, the approximately 3.2 billion letters in the
genome are reconstructed.
The human genome is encoded in double stranded
DNA molecules consisting of two complementary poly-
mer chains. Each chain consists of simple units called
nucleotides (A,C,G,T). The DNA of a person can be
retrieved from various sources (e.g., saliva, hair, skin,
blood). Once a sample is collected, the genetic mate-
rial is extracted and then sequenced – using a DNA se-
quencing platform – to obtain the so-called raw DNA
sequence. This is usually in the form of short reads,
each including hundreds of nucleotides from random
parts of the genome. Next, the raw reads are quality-
controlled, analyzed, and aligned to so-called reference
genome (a sequence database, assembled by scientists
as a representative example of our species’ set of genes),
allowing the progressive reconstruction of the whole se-
quenced genome. After further analysis of these short
reads, eventually, the 3.2 billion letters in the DNA se-
quence of the person are reconstructed.
Figure 1: Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP) with alle-
les C and T.
2.2 Genetic Variations
Even though most of the DNA sequence is conserved
across the whole human population, around 0.5% of
each person’s DNA (which corresponds to several mil-
lions of nucleotides) is different from the reference
genome, owing to genetic variations. Single nucleotide
polymorphism (SNP) is the most common DNA vari-
ation. A SNP is a position in the genome holding a
nucleotide that varies between individuals. For exam-
ple, in Fig. 1, two sequenced DNA fragments from two
individuals contain a single different nucleotide at a par-
ticular SNP position (i.e., locus). Multiple Genome-
Wide Association Studies (GWAS) performed in re-
cent years have shown that a patient’s susceptibility to
particular diseases can be partially predicted from sets
of his SNPs [16, 33]. For example, it was reported
that there are three genes bearing a total of ten par-
ticular SNPs necessary to (partially) analyze suscepti-
bility to Alzheimer’s disease [46]. Thus, leakage of
SNPs often poses a significant threat to individual pri-
vacy. Each SNP contributes to the susceptibility in a
different amount and the contribution amount of each
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Figure 2: Linkage disequilibrium (LD) between two SNP
positions with potential alleles (A1,A2) and (B1,B2), respec-
tively.
SNP is determined by Genome-Wide Association Stud-
ies (GWAS) [54] on case and control groups (these stud-
ies are published in several papers).
Each SNP position includes two alleles (i.e., two nu-
cleotides) and everyone inherits one allele of every SNP
position from each of his parents. If an individual re-
ceives the same allele from both parents, he is said to
be homozygous for that SNP position. If, however, he
inherits a different allele from each parent (one minor
and one major), he is called heterozygous. It is impor-
tant to note that a SNP becomes a variant when it carries
at least one minor allele.
There are approximately 40 million approved SNPs
in the human population as of now (according to the
NCBI dbSNP [40]) and each patient carries on average
4 million variants (i.e., SNPs carrying at least one minor
allele) out of this 40 million. We note that the number of
approved SNPs in human population is increasing very
rapidly [40], whereas the number of variants per patient
(around 4 million) remains the same. Moreover, this set
of 4 million variants is different for each patient.
2.3 Linkage Disequilibrium
An interesting characteristic of the SNPs, called
Linkage Disequilibrium (LD) [17], poses a notable pri-
vacy threat. LD is observed whenever SNPs are not
independent of each other. Therefore, the nucleotide
of a certain SNP can be inferred from the contents of
other SNP positions using the LD relationship. The
most well-known example of the aforementioned threat
is the ApoE status of Jim Watson (the co-discoverer
of DNA), who published his genome with the excep-
tion of his ApoE gene (which carries SNPs to deter-
mine the risk for Alzheimer’s disease). However, it
was later shown that these SNPs on his ApoE gene can
be (probabilistically) inferred using their LD relation-
ships with the published ones [43]. For example, as-
sume that SNPi and SNP j (SNPs which reside at po-
sitions i and j on the DNA sequence, respectively) are
in LD. Let (A1,A2) and (B1,B2) be the potential alleles
for these two SNP positions (i.e., loci) i and j. Fur-
ther, let (p1, p2) and (q1,q2) be the allele probabilities
of (A1,A2) and (B1,B2), respectively. That is, the prob-
ability that an individual will have A1 as the first al-
lele of SNPi is p1, and so on. (Recall that each SNP
position includes two alleles, i.e., two nucleotides.) If
there were no LD (i.e., if SNPi and SNP j were indepen-
dent), the probability that an individual will have both
A1 and B1 as the first alleles of SNPi and SNP j would be
p1q1. However, due to the LD, this probability is equal
to p1q1 +D, where D represents the LD between these
two SNP positions. In Fig. 2, we illustrate this LD re-
lationship for all possible combinations of (A1,A2) and
(B1,B2).
3 Towards Personalized Medicine
Widespread and affordable availability of fully se-
quenced human genomes creates enormous opportuni-
ties, which we summarize in Fig. 3 (and discuss in this
section).
In particular, whole genome sequencing (WGS) fa-
cilitates the advent of a new era of predictive, pre-
ventive, participatory, and personalized medicine (“P4
medicine”) [31]. Personalized genomic medicine is
recognized as a significant paradigm shift and a major
trend in health care [58], where treatment and medica-
tion type/dosage would be tailored to the precise genetic
makeup of individual patients.
For instance, certain genetic mutations are known
to alter drug metabolism, thus genomic tests are often
used today to predict a patient’s response to particu-
lar drugs. The study of the impact of genetic varia-
tions on the response to medications is called phar-
macogenomics. A well-known example in this direc-
tion includes testing for SNP mutations in the tpmt
gene for childhood leukemia patients, prior to prescrib-
ing 6-Mercaptopurine and Azathioprine drugs. The
tpmt gene codes for the TPMT enzyme that metabo-
lizes these drugs. Moreover, genetic polymorphisms af-
fecting enzymatic activity of TPMT are correlated with
variations in sensitivity and toxicity response to such
drugs. Other common examples include pre-testing
for Zelboraf (Roche’s treatment for advanced skin can-
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Figure 3: Applications of genomics.
cer), as well as pre-treatment testing for Philadelphia
chromosome mutations related to Acute Lymphoblastic
Leukemia (ALL) and BRCA1/BRCA2 genes in corre-
lation to familial breast and ovarian cancer syndromes.
Experts estimate that about a third of the 900 cancer
drugs currently in clinical trials could soon come to
market with an enclosed recommendation for a DNA
or another molecular test [10].
Vanderbilt University’s PREDICT program (Pharma-
cogenomic Resource for Enhanced Decisions in Care
and Treatment) [38] helps physicians tell which drugs
are most likely to work for their patients, and which
they should avoid, based on the genetic characteristics
of the patients, instead of long trial and error periods.
For instance, [59] reports how a specific cholesterol-
lowering drug was successfully selected based on the
genomic profile of a patient with coronary artery dis-
ease.
Experts predict that advances in WGS will fur-
ther stimulate advances in personalized medicine [23].
Commercial entities, such as Knome, already offer ser-
vices that take raw genomic data and create usable re-
ports for doctors. In general, availability of a patient’s
fully sequenced genome will enable clinicians, doc-
tors, and testing facilities to run a number of complex
and correlated genetic tests in a matter of seconds, us-
ing specialized computational algorithms, as opposed to
more expensive and slower in vitro tests.
Another recent Canadian study has shown how, for
some cardiac patients, recovery from a common heart
procedure can be complicated by a single gene respon-
sible for drug processing, and that selection of blood
thinner drugs should depend on whether or not patient
holds such a gene mutation [60]. Cancer treatment is
also one of the most predominant application fields of
personalized medicine.
The democratization of low-cost whole genome
genotyping and sequencing provides individuals with
direct access to their genomic information, including to
some genetic disease risk tests. For example, a well-
known commercial entity, 23andMe [1], provides rel-
atively low-cost genetic ancestry and disease risk tests
for 960,000 specific SNPs. However, 23andMe does
not yet offer WGS. Fig. 4 illustrates genetic disease
risk results of a real human with a fictional name “Greg
Mendel” provided by 23andMe. It shows the diseases
for which Greg Mendel’s calculated risk is higher than
average. In [52], Topol mentions a few real stories about
how the disease risk values obtained from 23andMe
helped early diagnosis of serious diseases.
While personalized medicine creates a lot of research
“enthusiasm”, a number of biomedical experts have also
expressed doubts related to the limits of gene mapping’s
power to predict a person’s likelihood of developing a
4
Figure 4: Genetic risks of Greg Mendel for several diseases (source: 23andMe).
disease [39]. This is because it is not always clear to
which extent certain diseases are correlated to genetic
or environmental factors (a list of diseases known to be
associated to genetic features is available in [16]).
Availability of WGS will also facilitate faster and
lower-cost digital versions of genetic tests that are cur-
rently performed in vitro. For instance, computational
paternity testing can be designed to mimic its in vitro
counterpart, with greater speed and accuracy, while pre-
serving its legal acceptance. Furthermore, ancestry
and genealogical testing is already offered by several
commercial entities. In such tests, publicly available ge-
nomic data from individuals belonging to different eth-
nic groups is compared against the customers’ genomic
information to understand how the customers relate to
known ethnic groups. Similarly, genetic compatibil-
ity tests, which let potential or existing partners assess
the risk of transmitting to their children genetic diseases
with Mendelian inheritance [37], are offered by various
online services.
4 Privacy and Ethical Pitfalls
While advances in whole genome sequencing are
paving the way to extraordinary progress in healthcare
(and beyond), they also prompt serious concerns. Be-
sides uniquely identifying its owner, a genome contains
information about one’s ethnic heritage, predisposition
to numerous physical and mental health conditions as
well as other phenotypic traits [19, 12, 21]. We illus-
trate two main privacy threats to genomic data in Fig. 5.
Recent studies suggest that even political preferences
may be influenced by voters’ genetic makeup [7].
Genomic privacy is often viewed with skepticism,
since every individual constantly sheds – or otherwise
leaves behind – his biological “footprints,” such as hair,
skin, or saliva. This material can be collected (even
much later) and used for DNA sequencing. However,
such attacks pose a credible threat only against a tar-
geted individual or a small group of people. The dan-
ger is clearly incomparable with privacy threats posed
by access to large numbers of digitized genomes – the
main focus of this paper.
Furthermore, traditional approaches to privacy, such
as de-identification or aggregation [35], are ineffec-
tive in the genomic context, since the genome itself
is the ultimate identifier [29]. For instance, a recent
study by Gymrek et al. [25] demonstrated feasibility
of re-identifying DNA donors from a public research
database using information available from popular ge-
nealogy Web sites and other available information. Ad-
ditional work on genomic re-identification includes [45]
and [29].
Moreover, the range of possible abuses is broadened
by the increasingly common handling and sharing of
health information (in electronic form) among insur-
ance companies, health care providers and employers.
Unfortunately, keeping digital records secure is a prob-
lem [47]. For instance, medical information of 34,000
patients was leaked from Howard University Hospi-
tal; also, hackers compromised servers of Utah Depart-
ment of Health and stolen medical information of al-
most 800,000 individuals.
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Figure 5: Threats to privacy of human genomic data. (Part of the figure is prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy
Genomic Science program.)
The privacy problem is further exacerbated by the
fact that genomes of any two closely related individu-
als are highly similar. Thus, disclosure of one’s genome
leads to leakage of significant genomic information
about that person’s close relatives, including parents,
siblings and offspring. This is a problem regardless of
how the disclosure occurs: voluntarily, accidentally or
maliciously. Therefore, genomic privacy is a unique
issue, since, in most other privacy-sensitive scenarios,
only the individual’s data is at stake. Whereas, in the
genomic context, disclosure of personal information
impacts a potentially large group of individuals. The
most recent example of this issue is the controversy be-
tween family members of the deceased Henrietta Lacks
(whose genome was sequenced and published after her
death, without getting the permission of her family) and
scientists who are in favor of publishing genomes online
for research purposes [50].
Even more worrying is that consequences of genomic
data disclosure are not limited in time. In certain pri-
vacy leakage scenarios, some recourse is possible. For
example, bank account numbers and passwords can be
changed, physical or electronic documents (even pub-
lic key certificates) can be replaced and old ones can
be revoked. In contrast, a genome is neither mutable
nor “revokable”. Moreover, as large portions thereof
are passed on to future generations, disclosure of one’s
genomic information can turn into an endless curse for
future generations.
Based on the above, it is not surprising that privacy
concerns represent a formidable obstacle for assem-
bling large human genomic databases, e.g., for the pur-
pose of conducting Genome-Wide Association Studies
(GWAS). More generally, privacy concerns might ac-
tually stand in the way of advances in medicine and
consequent improvements in overall healthcare. The
same could apply in the domain of law enforcement
where DNA-based identification is being increasingly
used and there is a need for secure and reliable handling
of large numbers of genomes.
In US, the federal government has been aware of pri-
vacy and ethical issues in genomics. For example, as
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early as 1990, the National Human Genome Research
Institute (NHGRI) established the Ethical, Legal and
Social Implications (ELSI) Research Program with the
goal of exploring repercussions of advances in genetic
and genomic research on individuals, families and com-
munities.
Federal laws, such as the 2003 Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), provide a
general framework for protecting and sharing Protected
Health Information (PHI). Furthermore, the Genetic In-
formation Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) adopted in
1998 prohibits discrimination on the basis of genetic
information with respect to health insurance and em-
ployment [55]. Also, some states, e.g., California, have
recently started to consider DNA privacy laws [48].
Even the popular culture, via sci-fi movies and lit-
erature, has touched upon genetic discrimination. For
instance, the notion of genism that originated in the
1997 movie “GATTACA”, refers to the theory that dis-
tinctive human characteristics and abilities are deter-
mined by genes, resulting in discrimination as perni-
cious as racism [2]. Influenced by this movie, a promi-
nent molecular biologist wrote: “Gattaca is a film that
all geneticists should see if for no other reason than to
understand the perception of our trade held by so many
of the public-at-large” [49].
While providing general guidelines, current legis-
lation does not offer sufficient technical information
about safe and secure ways of storing and processing
digitized genomes. We believe that security and privacy
issues for genomic data (in the context of both individ-
ual genomes and databases thereof) are timely, impor-
tant and relatively poorly understood.
Privacy practitioners and consumer organizations are
strongly advocating the need for more restrictive leg-
islation as a result of gaps in current policies. Also,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has analyzed
warrant-less DNA gathering from suspects and against
DHS’s efforts to collect genetic data from people placed
into administrative detention. A recent report from the
US Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethi-
cal Issues [44] analyzed advances of WGS, and high-
lighted growing privacy and security concerns. This
report makes a few privacy and security recommenda-
tions, including, unfortunately, de-identification.
At the policy level, challenges include the need for
informed consent to guard against surreptitious DNA
testing. Authorities and companies should obtain writ-
ten permission from citizens before collecting, analyz-
ing, storing or sharing their genetic information, e.g.,
preventing collection of hair or saliva samples and us-
ing them for unauthorized sequencing.
On the other hand, some academics fear that restric-
tive (privacy-friendly) measures could seriously hin-
der genomic research. Scientists typically sequence
DNA from large numbers of people in order to deter-
mine genes associated with particular diseases. The in-
formed consent restriction would mean that large ge-
nomic datasets could not be re-used to study a differ-
ent disease; researchers would either need to destroy
the data after each study, or track down all previously
enrolled study participants for each new authorization.
Also, similarity of related individuals’ genomes raises
doubts as to whether relatives should also provide con-
sent.
Finally, collection and analysis of human genomes
does not arise only in the contexts of research stud-
ies and improved healthcare. It also comes up in
increasingly popular commercial (for-profit) applica-
tions, which are not well-regulated. An example is
genepartner.com, which claims to do matchmaking
based on unclear genetic features.
5 Existing Work on Genomic Privacy
Due to the sensitivity of genomic data, research on
the privacy of genomic data has accelerated over the
past few years. First, a few techniques have been pro-
posed for secure and privacy-preserving computation
on DNA fragments/snippets. More recently, the se-
curity community started focusing on fully-sequenced
genomes, motivated by the advances in WGS.
In [53], Troncoso-Pastoriza et al. propose a proto-
col for string searching (then re-visited by Blanton and
Aliasgari [8]), where one party with his own DNA snip-
pet can verify the existence of a short template within
his snippet by using a Finite State Machine (FSM) in
an oblivious manner. Also, secure pattern matching
techniques, e.g., those in [22] and [28], have been ap-
plied to securely search binary strings in a DNA snip-
pet. Katz et al. [34] realize secure computation of the
CODIS test [51] (run by the FBI for DNA identity test-
ing) and other search tests that could not be otherwise
implemented using pattern matching or FSM.
To compute the similarity of DNA sequences, in [32],
Jha et al. propose techniques for privately computing
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the edit distance of two strings by using garbled circuits.
In [9], Bruekers et al. propose privacy-enhanced com-
parison of DNA profiles for identity and paternity tests,
using homomorphic encryption on DNA snippets.
Baldi et al. [6] are the first to focus on whole genomes
and introduce several cryptographic protocols, based
on Private Set Operations, that realize secure testing of
whole human genomes, e.g., paternity tests and genetic
screening for personalized medicine or recessive ge-
netic diseases. In their setting, individuals obtain their
genomes and allow authorized parties (e.g., doctors and
clinicians) to run genetic tests such that only test re-
sults are disclosed to one or both parties (with provable
security). In a follow-up work, De Cristofaro et al. pro-
poses a framework and implement a toolkit, called Gen-
oDroid [15] for privacy-preserving genomic tests on
Android smartphones. In [11], Canim et al. propose se-
curing biomedical data using cryptographic hardware.
Ayday et al. [3, 4, 5] also focus on the privacy of
personal use of genomic data (e.g., in medical tests and
personalized medicine methods), and propose methods
for protecting user’s genomic privacy by considering
the statistical relationship between the variants.
When releasing databases consisting of aggre-
gate genomic data (e.g., for research purposes),
known privacy-preserving approaches, such as de-
identification, are ineffective on (un-encrypted) ge-
nomic data [56, 36]. Homer et al. [30] prove that the
presence of an individual in a case group can be de-
termined by using aggregate allele frequencies and his
DNA profile. In another study [24], Gitschier shows
that a combination of information, from genealogical
registries and a haplotype analysis of the Y chromo-
some collected for The HapMap Project, allows for the
prediction of the surnames of a number of individuals
held in the HapMap database. Thus, releasing (aggre-
gate) genomic data is currently banned by many insti-
tutions due to this privacy risk. In [61], Zhou et al.
study the privacy risks of releasing the aggregate ge-
nomic data. They propose a risk-scale system to clas-
sify aggregate data and a guide for the release of such
data. Recently, Fienberg et al. [18] use differential pri-
vacy to ensure that two aggregated genomic databases,
differing from each other by only one individual’s data,
have indistinguishable statistical features. However,
this method does not work well for sparse databases and
severely affects the reliability of the genomic data (due
to noise injection).
Finally, Wang et al. [57] propose a privacy-protection
framework for important classes of genomic computa-
tions (e.g., search for homologous genes), in which they
partition a genomic computation, distributing sensitive
data to the data provider and the public data to the data
user. Also, Chen et al. [14] propose a secure cloud-
based algorithm to align short DNA sequences to a ref-
erence (human) DNA sequence (i.e., read mapping).
6 Open Research Problems
As discussed above, advances in genomics will soon
result in large numbers of individuals having their
genomes sequenced and obtaining digitized versions
thereof. This poses a wide range of technical problems,
which we explore below.
Storage and Accessibility: Genome at Rest. Due to
its sensitivity and size (about 3.2 billion nucleotides),
one key challenge is where and how a digitized genome
should be stored. It is reasonable to assume that an in-
dividual who requests (and likely pays for) genome se-
quencing should own the result, as is already the case
with any other personal medical results and informa-
tion. This raises numerous issues, including:
(1) Should the genome be stored on one’s personal de-
vices, e.g., a PC or a smartphone? If so, what,
if any, special hardware security features (e.g.,
tamper-resistance) are needed?
(2) Can it be outsourced to a cloud provider?
(3) Should the sequencing facility keep an escrowed
copy of the genome?
(4) Should it be entrusted to one’s personal physician
and/or health insurance provider?
(5) How is it to be stored: in the clear or encrypted? If
the latter, where are encryption keys generated: at
the lab? at owner’s premises? at the cloud provider?
Where are these keys stored?
(6) How to guarantee integrity and authenticity of the
digitized genome?
(7) Should backups be made? If so, how often and
where can copies be kept?
(8) How can one erase a genome securely?
(9) Should an individual periodically re-sequence their
genome to take advantage of more accurate tech-
nology?
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Privacy: Genome in Action. Given the genome’s sen-
sitivity, an individual should, ideally, never disclose any
information contained therein. However, this would
prevent the access to any genomic application that can-
not be entirely and securely performed in situ, i.e.,
within a secure perimeter of one’s own personal device.
In principle, this might be possible if operations are per-
formed in some standardized and certified form. For ex-
ample, if testing for a genetic disease requires matching
a well-known pattern in some approximate location in
the genome, that pattern and its parameters can be cer-
tified by some trusted agency (such as the US Food and
Drug Administration). Thus, an individual could be as-
sured that a legitimate test for a specific genetic disease
is being conducted and the result is clearly communi-
cated to that individual; the latter would then have the
option to keep the result private.
At the same time, it is hard to foresee the range
and complexity of future genetic operations: some (fu-
ture) tests might be too computationally complex to
be performed within the confines of a personal de-
vice. Furthermore, some genetic testing would proba-
bly involve multiple genomes, e.g., when tracing ori-
gins of some conditions, siblings or parents/children
might need to be tested together. Similarly, in assess-
ing risks of genetic conditions for future progeny, both
prospective parents have to be tested. Also, some ge-
netic tests constitute intellectual property of a pharma-
ceutical/biomedical company (which needs to be pro-
tected) [41, 27, 13].
As soon as genomic information leaves the (virtual)
hands of its owner, purely technical approaches to pri-
vacy become insufficient. Legal and professional guide-
lines are certainly needed to govern how information is
transmitted, stored, processed, and eventually disposed
of on the receiving end, e.g., by the physician, hospital,
pharmacist or medical lab.
Long-term data protection. Even if genomes are
encrypted, encryption schemes considered strong to-
day might gradually weaken in the long term, whereas
genome sensitivity does not dissipate over time. It is not
too far-fetched to imagine that a third-party in posses-
sion of an encrypted genome might be able to decrypt it
years or decades later. For instance, the Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) scheme supports key lengths
up to 256 bits – a key length estimated by NIST, fol-
lowing Moore’s law, to be secure several years after
2030 [42]. However, computational breakthroughs or
unforeseen weaknesses might allow breaking the en-
cryption earlier than expected. Also, even leakage of
a long-deceased individual’s genome could affect ge-
nomic privacy of that person’s living progeny.
Assuming that it can not be copied, an encrypted
genome could be periodically re-encrypted. Alterna-
tively, one could split the genome, using secret-sharing
techniques, and partition it among several providers.
However, this opens the problem of efficient reassem-
bly of the genome for various operations as well as how
to guarantee non-collusion between providers.
Accuracy and Accountability: Computational ge-
nomic tests should guarantee accuracy at least equiva-
lent to that of their current analog in vitro counterparts.
For example, a software implementation of the paternity
test should offer at least the same confidence as its in
vitro counterpart currently admissible in a court of law.
Also, computational tests should aim at accountability,
e.g., by providing lasting guarantees of correctness for
both execution and input information.
Efficiency. Computational genomic tests should in-
cur minimal communication/computational costs. Min-
imality in this setting is relative to the context of such
tests. For instance, patients may be inclined (and accus-
tomed) to wait several days to obtain results of genetic
tests that concern their health. However in the compu-
tational setting, long running times on personal devices
might hinder the real-world practicality of these tests
(besides negating one of the main motivations for com-
putational tests.)
Usability. Computational genomic tests that involve
end-users should be usable by, and meaningful to, reg-
ular non-tech-savvy individuals. This translates into
non-trivial questions, such as: how much understand-
ing should be expected from a user running a test? What
information (and at what level of granularity) should be
presented to the user as part of a test and as its outcome?
Do privacy perceptions and concerns experienced by
patients match those expected by the scientific com-
munity? Some users might be willing to forego their
genomic privacy in some certain cases. For instance,
one may think that patients will be likely to reveal their
genomes to their medical doctors (and hence trade off
privacy of their genomes) to enable tests that can save
them from, e.g., cancer. In contract, in the case of on-
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line services or pharmaceuticals, an individual might
not wish to forgo privacy. However, very few efforts
(e.g., [20]) has focused on users’ concerns, thus prompt-
ing the need for ethnographic studies. Also, there re-
mains an open problem of how to effectively communi-
cate to the users potential privacy risks associated with
genomic information and its disclosure.
Large-scale research on human genomes. As dis-
cussed in Section 4, potential privacy, legal, and ethi-
cal concerns appear to conflict with large-scale research
on human genomes, such as Genome-Wide Associa-
tion Studies (GWAS). However, large scale studies are
needed to discover associations between genetic make-
up and medical conditions. One current trend is to store
donors’ genomes in the cloud and use analytics tech-
niques running on powerful computer clusters. Once
again, this prompts many privacy and legal concerns.
7 Conclusion
This paper discussed some “chills and thrills” of an
emerging phenomenon – affordable and readily avail-
able genomic sequencing. As something radically
novel, it brings great opportunities and significant con-
cerns, especially pertaining to personal privacy. Miti-
gating privacy issues will require long-term collabora-
tion among geneticists, other healthcare providers, ethi-
cists, lawmakers, and computer scientists. As one of the
first steps towards such a collaboration, we are involved
in organizing a multi-disciplinary seminar on genomic
privacy [26]. In order to foster this collaboration, fund-
ing agencies need to target this topic. Until recently,
at least in the United States, genomic privacy unfortu-
nately fell into a sort of a “funding gap” between sev-
eral agencies. One obvious candidate for playing a key
funding role is the National Institute of Health (NIH).
Yet, although it covers both bioinformatics and WGS
ethical issues, NIH has funded little research in the ge-
nomic privacy context. The National Science Founda-
tion (NSF), the main agency responsible for funding
academic computer-science research, recently initiated
a “Smart and Connected Health” program that includes
so-called “integrative projects” requiring collaboration
among computer and health sciences. It remains to be
seen whether this program will engender long-range ge-
nomic privacy research. Other US funding agencies
have not, thus far, targeted genomic privacy. A similar
situation can be observed in Europe: of course, there
are numerous EU and nationally funded projects focus-
ing on e-health, some of which address data protection.
However, the genomic privacy challenge has been over-
looked, and the number of computer scientists working
on the topic is even lower than in the United States. An
additional issue is that, although most officials in charge
of data protection typically have a strong legal back-
ground, they lack computer science expertise. Conse-
quently and not surprisingly, they tend to rely on legis-
lation more than on technology.
In conclusion, we hope that the privacy issues high-
lighted in the article will be addressed promptly and en-
courage collaboration among researchers in the fields
outlined above. We believe that consideration of such
privacy issues will have a positive benefit to society and
individuals in their daily lives.
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